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Communities’ (“Commission”) recently published White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules
Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (“White
Paper”), namely the ending of the authorization and notification system.
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INTRODUCTION
This Essay discusses concerns raised by the core proposal in
the Commission of European Communities' ("Commission") re-
cently published White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Im-
plementing Articles 85 and 86 Of the Treaty establishing the Eu-
ropean Community ("White Paper"), namely the ending of the
authorization and notification system.' It analyzes other pro-
posed amendments to the Commission's investigative powers
and to the system of penalties. It proposes further options for
reform, such as combining the directly applicable exception sys-
tem proposed by the White Paper with a system of voluntary noti-
fication and a mechanism for clear and flexible allocation of
competence between the European Community ("EC" or "Com-
* Partner, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, Brussels/Rome. The author wishes
to acknowledge the invaluable contributions of Annette Schild, Filippo Amato, Paul
Laikin and of all his other colleagues who participated in developing this Essay. This
Essay is prepared from a speech given at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute Sympo-
sium on October 14-15, 1999.
1. White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of
the EC Treaty, Commission Programme No. 99/027, O.J. C 132/1 (1999) [hereinafter
White Paper]. See Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C
224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made
by Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, Oj. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719
[hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty on European Union ("TEU") amended the Treaty es-
tablishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [here-
inafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA]. The Treaty establishing the European Community
("EC Treaty") was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related
acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. These
amendments were incorporated into the EC Treaty, and the articles of the EC Treaty
were renumbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European
Community, OJ. C 340/3 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 79 [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty],
incorporating changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra. Although the White Paper on
Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty ("White
Paper") uses the old numbering of the EC Treaty, most quotations in the present text
are updated to the new numbering resulting from the entry into force of the Treaty of
Amsterdam. The White Paper, therefore, currently addresses Article 81 and 82, not 85
and 86, of the EC Treaty.
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munity") and National Competition Authorities in the Member
States (or "NCAs"). To a large extent, the proposal outlined be-
low combines elements discussed by the European Commission
(or "Commission") in the White Paper, but which are treated
there as alternatives rather than as cumulative measures.
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Commission and the legal and business communities
agree that the present system of implementing Articles 81 and
82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC
Treaty") is unsatisfactory. Any reasonable reform that addresses
the shortcomings of the current system is likely to find a warm
welcome. The White Paper is a good step in this direction. It
may, however, have the side effect of further reducing legal cer-
tainty for undertakings and threaten the consistent and uniform
application of EC competition law. The following modified sys-
tem should be considered for at least a transitional stage.
First, the Commission should introduce the proposed sys-
tem of legal exception, but there should still be an option of
notifying the Commission of important agreements. The Com-
mission should decide whether to accept such notifications and
their substantive merits within certain time limits. Second, noti-
fications could be forwarded to NCAs for treatment under Arti-
cle 81 if the notified agreements are mainly national in charac-
ter, but instances where the Commission can do so should be
well defined. A possibility of notifying on Form A/B directly to
NCAs could also be created, but the Commission should be al-
lowed to withdraw jurisdiction from an NCA in cases of commu-
nity interest before the latter has adopted a decision. Third, na-
tional courts could be allowed to apply Article 81(3), but must
stay proceedings if the agreement under dispute is notified to
the Commission and the Commission or an NCA opens proceed-
ings. Fourth, opinions of the Commission arrived at without in-
depth investigation should be non-binding. If the Commission
fails to adopt a decision or refer a case before the time limit,
then this should have the effect of a comfort letter. NCA and
Commission decisions arrived after in-depth investigation should
be binding throughout the European Union (or "EU").
Next, if a complaint is filed under Articles 81 or 82, only
one NCA should deal with the case. If the Commission or an
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NCA opens a proceeding on its own initiative, then the other
NCAs should be barred from dealing with the case. Finally, ade-
quate rules should safeguard the rights of the defense, including
proper notice and attendance of counsel for oral examinations
of individuals, and exclusion of qualified in-house counsel from
the obligation to testify.
II. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A. The Current Notification System and Its Shortcomings
The main shortcomings of the current system of notifica-
tion to the Commission are the following. First, as a result of the
Commission's current wide application of Article 81(1),2 even
agreements that raise little or no risk of anti-competitive impact
are deemed illegal and unenforceable if they have not been noti-
fied and exempted. An example of such a case is where there is
no harm to consumer welfare in terms of price or output effects
because they restrict only competition that could not have taken
place in their absence, or restrict competition less than they in-
crease it.
3
Second, the automatic voiding of Article 81(2) agreements
that breach Article 81 (1) gives rise to complications when a na-
tional court is requested in private litigation to enforce an agree-
ment that has been notified to the Commission, and may there-
fore later be exempted retrospectively to the time of the national
litigation.4 This situation discourages companies from undertak-
2. According to the European Commission ("Commission"), almost any restriction
of the commercial freedom of one or more of the parties to an agreement amounts to a
restriction of competition prohibited by Article 81 (1) of the EC Treaty. The possibility
to apply a "rule of reason" approach and to narrow the application of Article 81 (1) is
not discussed further, although that issue should be seriously reconsidered as an ap-
proach to limit the Commission's "notification and exemption" workload.
3. See Christopher Bright, Deregulation of EC Competition Policy: Rethinking Article
85(1), in 1994 FoDmHAM CoRp. L. INsT. 505, 515 (Barry Hawk ed., 1995). This applies
unless such agreements are tailored to fit squarely into one of the existing block exemp-
tion regulation "straitjackets." In addition, since an agreement is eligible for an exemp-
tion (or informal clearance) only if all the conditions in Article 81(3) are met, the low
Article 81 (1) jurisdictional threshold means that agreements that are benign in their
impact on the competitive process, but do not fulfill the Article 81(3) test because they
do not advance technical or economic progress, cannot be exempted. Id.; see also Mario
Siragusa, Future Competition Law, 1997 Competition Workshop, Florence, June 13-14,
1997 (on file with the author).
4. See Delimitis v. Henninger Briu, Case C-234/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-935, 1-993,
50-54, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 210, 252; Commission Notice, O.J. C 39/6, 11 23, 30, 32
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ing potentially beneficial projects that involve substantial invest-
ment.
Third, the notification and exemption process is unsatisfac-
tory. The Commission monopolizes the application of Article
81(3) and is overwhelmed by the number of notifications filed
every year. For companies, the procedure of notifying agree-
ments is onerous and often takes several years to lead to any re-
sult. In most cases, the result obtained provides little legal cer-
tainty to undertakings as no formal decision is adopted, and the
procedure closes with no more than a non-binding5 comfort let-
ter being issued.6
B. The Commission's Reform Package
The last decade witnessed much debate on the need to re-
form the rules enforcing EC competition law. From this debate,
it is clear that serious proposals for reform should achieve three
fundamental objectives: (i) reduce the Commission's workload;
(ii) increase legal certainty for business; and (iii) maintain con-
sistency in the application of EC competition rules.
Recently, the Commission started modifying individual ele-
ments of the system and proposing changes to the overall struc-
ture. First, the revision of the Merger Regulation7 that entered
(1993) ("Notice on Cooperation with National Courts"). If a national court is re-
quested to enforce an agreement that has been notified to the Commission (or does
not require notification pursuant to Article 4(2) of Regulation 17), then it may alterna-
tively decide: (a) that Article 81(1) is inapplicable; (b) that the agreement infringes
Article 81(1) and is not eligible for exemption; (c) to stay proceedings or adopt in-
terim measures pursuant to domestic procedure, if there is a possibility that an exemp-
tion may be granted; or (d) to refer the matter to the Court of Justice (the "Court")
under Article 234. Id; see also De Norre v. Brouwerij Concordia, Case 47/76, [1977]
E.C.R. 65, 83-84, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 378, 406 (submitting that national court determina-
tion that agreement will likely be exempted by Commission does not amount to grant-
ing exemption). The European Court ofJustice ("Court"), however, did not adjudicate
this issue. De Norre, [1977] E.C.R. at 83-84, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. at 406.
5. SA Lanc6me and Cosparfrance Nederland BV v. Etos BV and Albert Heyn
Supermart BV, Case 99/79, [1980] E.C.R. 2511 (holding that comfort letter does not
bind national courts, but only constitutes element of fact national courts and National
Competition Authorities (or "NCA") may consider).
6. Terminating proceedings by issuing these letters means that the Commission's
workload is not substantially reduced (even proceedings concluded by way of comfort
letter require investigation, a legal review of the agreement, and an economic assess-
ment of its effects on competition), and the notifying undertakings do not obtain a
sufficient degree of legal certainty.
7. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, O.J. L 395, at 1 (1989).
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into force in January 1998 brought full function cooperative
joint ventures, formerly reviewable under the Regulation 178
procedure, under the mandatory merger review regime. Sec-
ond, the modification in June 1999 of Article 4(2)'of Regulation
17 led to the inclusion of most vertical agreements in the list of
agreements that do not require notification prior to exemption.
These two steps alone have enabled the Commission, even in
cases of late notification, to consider whether the agreement in
question satisfies Article 81 (3) and, if so, to adopt an exemption
decision effective as of the date the agreement was entered. 9
Third, the Commission proposed a very broad vertical restraints
block exemption to cover cases that might have previously been
notified. The block exemption might also add to the number of
agreements that companies wish to notify since the Commission
wants to restrict it to companies with a market share of less than
thirty percent. Finally in its White Paper, the Commission pro-
poses a wide-range system of reforms. The core of the Commis-
sion's proposal is the ending of the exemption and notification
system established by Regulation 17.10 Under the proposed sys-
tem, the Commission would lose its monopoly to apply Article
81(3). Parties to agreements, decisions, or concerted practices
could invoke Article 81(3) before any NCA or national court.11
In addition to the main reform, the White Paper proposes to
strengthen the Commission's powers of inquiry, to increase the
importance of complaints, and to bring the system of penalties
under Regulation 17, unchanged since 1962, into line with the
penalties under the Merger Regulation.
The principal declared purposes of the White Paper re-
8. Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13J.O. 204 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62,
at 87.
9. This revision would appear to bring the Commission's practice more in line
with that of several Member States that consider vertical restraints significantly less dan-
gerous for the structure of competition than horizontal restraints and therefore assess
them as potential abuses, rather than under an authorization system. See also Competi-
tion Act (1998) (U.K.) (proposing Statutory Instrument exempting most vertical agree-
ments from scope of Article 81(1) type prohibitions on anti-competitive agreements
contained in Competition Act).
10. See White Paper, supra note 1, O.J. C 132/1, at 20, 75 (1999) (stating that one
of main elements of proposed reform is "the ending of the system of notification and
authorisation.").
11. Thus, in a way, the reform would end the split between Article 81(1) and (3),
as it would no longer matter whether a market analysis is carried out under one or the
other.
1093
1094 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 23:1089
forms are: (i) reduction of the workload created by notifications
in order to allow the Commission "to use its resources to combat
cartels, particularly in concentrated markets and in markets
which are being liberalised;" 12 and (ii) decentralization of the
application of EC competition law. The relief of administrative
constraints on undertakings is also mentioned as an objective of
the reform,13 but this seems more like a means of reducing the
Commission's workload than an objective in itself. A final un-
spoken objective appears to be the desire to reduce DG IV's
workload before the future enlargement of the European
Union. There is a risk, however, that the reforms are at the ex-
pense of the objectives of legal certainty and consistency.
III. DISCUSSION OF THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL
A. Ending the Authorization System Is a Positive Step and Permitted
by the Treaty
Replacement of the authorization system by a system of
legal exception is a positive step that should lead to increased
legal certainty in "simple" cases. One of the advantages of the
system proposed by the Commission is that the introduction of a
system of legal exception is arguably possible without an EC
Treaty amendment. 4 The present text of Article 81(3) was spe-
cifically drafted to permit both a system of prior authorization
(as requested by Germany) and a system of legal exception (as
proposed by France)."
12. White Paper, supra note 1, O.J. C 132/1, at 15, 1 45 (1999).
13. Id., O.J. C 132/1 at 14, 42 (1999).
14. Id., O.J. C 132/1 at 4, 12 (1999). It states that:
The proposed reform involves the abolition of the notification and exemption
system and its replacement by a Council Regulation which would render the
exemption rule of Article [81(3)] directly applicable without prior decision by
the Commission. Article [81] as a whole would be applied by the Commission,
national competition authorities and national courts, as is already the case for
Articles [81(1) and 82].
Id., O.J. C 132/1 at 4, 12 (1999).
15. See, e.g., Wouter P.J. Wils, Notification, Clearance and Exemption in E.C. Competi-
tion Law: An Economic Analysis, 24 EUR. L. REV. 139, 155 (1999); see also Arved Deringer,
Les Rigles de la Concurrence au Sein de la C.E.E. (Analyse et Commentaire des Articles 85 ti 94
du Traiti), 7 REVUE DU MARCHt COMMUN 560 (1964) (providing good overview of his-
tory of Article 81 and of Franco-German compromise).
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B. The Commission's Proposal Reduces Legal Certainty
The Commission's discretion as to whether to deal with a
case reduces legal certainty. As the White Paper recalls, the noti-
fication system set out by Regulation 17 sought to establish the
conditions for providing business with adequate legal certainty.16
Today, the Commission claims that a reform of the system estab-
lished by Regulation 17 is necessary because that system induces
companies to notify "systematically" their restrictive practices,
17
and "to block private action before national courts and national
competition authorities." i" To solve these problems, the White
Paper proposes ending the notification system."
The Commission claims that this will lead to legal certainty
for the following two reasons. First, it argues that the history of
applying Articles 81 and 82 has "clarified" the law.2' This is true,
however, only to a certain degree. There are still agreements
containing restrictions that cannot easily be subsumed under
any of the categories of restrictions on which the Commission or
the courts have decided in the past. This problem is exacer-
bated by the fact that the Commission is, at the same time, pro-
posing radical changes to the present system. These changes in-
clude the removal of block exemptions from firms with market
power, so that precedents under the "old system" may end up
being of limited value.2' In addition, because of commercial
and technical developments (such as the Internet), new catego-
ries of agreements and practices arise continuously, in respect to
which there are no precedents. Second, the Commission tries to
allay fears of legal uncertainty by referring to its intention to en-
act new block exemptions that cover a very wide range of agree-
ments. While this is laudable in principle, the problem again is
that the present draft block exemption on vertical restraints
16. White Paper, supra note 1, O.J. C 132/1, at 4-5, 14 (1999).
17. Id., O.J. C 132/1, at 10, 1 24 (1999).
18. Id., O.J. C 132/1, at 3, 1 6 (1999) of the executive summary.
19. Jonathan Faull, Speech at the Conference Organized by the EU Committee of
American Chamber of Commerce in Brussels, European Competition Policy into the
New Millennium (June 30, 1999) (on file with the author) (stating that White Paper's
proposal does not intend to prevent companies notifying their agreement to Commis-
sion). However, under the new system, the Commission would be completely free to
decide whether or not to accept and decide on a case. Id.
20. White Paper, supra note 1, O.J. C 132/1, at 15-16, 48 (1999).
21. NERA COMPETITION BRIEF, THE COMMISSION'S WHITE PAPER ON MODERNISA-
TION: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND LEGAL CERTAINTY (July 1999) (on file with the author).
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would apply only to companies that have a market share of less
than thirty percent. Accordingly, companies with market power
would again be unable to establish the legality of their agree-
ments before they implemented them.
Undertakings currently notify the Commission solely for
one reason. A look at the Commission's own statistics shows that
undertakings typically notify neither systematically, nor for dila-
tory purposes, but to obtain legal certainty when the compatibil-
ity of their agreements with Article 81 is in doubt, and the risks
resulting from legal uncertainty are high.
First, as the Commission states in its Competition Report,
companies rarely use the centralized authorization system of
Regulation 17 "to block private action before national courts
and national competition authorities."22 On the contrary, dila-
tory notifications "form a very small percentage of all notifica-
tions to the Commission." 2' This is shown by the fact that in
1998 the Commission encountered only three cases of dilatory
notification, which is less than two percent of the notifications
filed that year.24
Second, a look at the number of notifications shows that, if
given a chance to do so, companies will not "systematically" no-
tify all their restrictive practices.25 Under the present system, a
decision not to notify leads to a risk that the agreement may be
declared void in national courts and that the undertakings that
are party to it may be fined. Nevertheless, and despite the fact
that the enormous breadth in the interpretation of Article 81 (1)
means that virtually any agreement between undertakings could
be found to be covered by it, in the last decade only 210-230
agreements have been notified each year to the Commission. In-
22. See White Paper, supra note 1, OJ. C 132/1, at 7, 6 of the executive summary
(1999) (stating that this practice "has undermined efforts to promote decentralised
application of EC competition rules" and that "the rigorous enforcement of competi-
tion law has suffered and efforts to decentralise the implementation of Community law
have been thwarted.").
23. Commission Notice on Cooperation between National Competition Authori-
ties and the Commission in Handling Cases Falling within the Scope of Article 85 or 86
of the Treaty, OJ. C 313/3, at 10, 55 (1997) [hereinafter Notice on Cooperation with
NCAs].
24. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COMPETITION POLICY, XXVIIITH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY, 1998 19, 30 (1999).
25. See Valentine Korah, The White Paper (on file with the author) (stating that "the
Commission is wrong to say at para. 24 that firms notify systematically. Most of us have
seldom advised notification of many agreements").
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deed, in recent years more notifications have been filed annually
under the Merger Regulation than on Form A/B.26
In our own experience as practitioners, agreements are nor-
mally notified only when they involve considerable investments
and when clear guidance by Community case law or Commission
practice is absent. Notifications are expensive and burdensome,
and, even after lengthy proceedings, normally lead to no more
than a comfort letter. Only in important cases do the advantages
of notification-elimination of the risk of Commission fines and
possible annulment or damages actions before National
Courts-outweigh the burden and expense of completing Form
A/B.
Under the system proposed by the Commission, companies
that are genuinely concerned about the validity of their agree-
ments could not be certain that these agreements would be ex-
amined authoritatively before implementation. They would face
the danger that their practices are found to infringe Article 81 of
the EC Treaty after many years of application, and that they
would have to pay damages in court or even be fined-as the
Commission proposes-up to ten percent of their turnover.
The White Paper does not seem to (and should not) ex-
clude the possibility that the Commission could still decide on
difficult cases that contain problems not previously decided
upon if it becomes aware of them (in whatever way) .27 However,
26. In 1998, the Commission received 235 notifications under the Merger Regula-
tion. That is 19 more than were received under Regulation 17.
27. See White Paper, supra note 1, O.J. C 132/1, at 20, 75 (1999). It is unclear
whether, when proposing "the ending of the notification and authorization system," the
White Paper envisages the abolition of any form of notification or only the ending of
the notifications for exemption. Id., O.J. C 132/1, at 20, 75 (1999); see also C.S.
KERSE, E.C. ANTrlRUST PROCEDURE 54 (1998). Technically speaking, the term "notifica-
tion" is "generally used loosely to mean the process whereby copies of the agreement
under cover of Form A/B are supplied to the Commission." KERSE, supra, at 54. Regu-
lation 17 covers the term as a request for exemption (Regulation 17, Article 4(1)),
while the term "application" applies to a request for negative clearance (Regulation 17,
Article 2). Accordingly, if the White Paper uses the term notification in its technical
sense, applications for negative clearance would still be possible under the new system.
A number of statements in the White Paper seem to leave open this possibility. In
particular, the White Paper states that, although the Commission would no longer
adopt exemption decisions, "it should nevertheless be able to adopt individual deci-
sions that are not prohibition decisions." White Paper, supra note 1, O.J. C 132/1, at
22, 88 (1999). However, these decisions "would be taken [only] ... in exceptional
cases," where "a transaction raises a question that is new," and it is "necessary to provide
the market with guidance regarding the Commission's approach to certain restrictions
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for undertakings that are faced with significant financial expo-
sure, the mere possibility of the Commission's intervention if the
case is deemed sufficiently "novel" (or high profile) is simply not
sufficient.2 s Companies need a minimum degree of legal cer-
tainty, which they can find only if there is a procedure through
which they can trust that the Commission will consider the legal-
ity of their agreement, and do so within a reasonable time frame.
Otherwise, uncertain whether they will be able to obtain a bind-
ing decision by the Commission, companies might be induced to
give up their agreement or try to fit it into the straitjacket of
existing case law or block exemptions. That cannot be the pur-
pose of a system reform.
Companies' inability to obtain binding decisions reduces
legal certainty. Under the system proposed in the White Paper,
the Commission appears to reserve the right to take binding de-
cisions if these are negative or if they impose conditions on the
parties.2 9 Positive decisions, which the Commission would take
"to clarify the scope of application of Articles 81(1) and 81(3)
in it." White Paper, supra. This condition currently applies to negative clearance deci-
sions, which the Commission issues "only where an important problem of interpreta-
tion has to be solved," found in Form A/B, A.II.1, and recalls the criterion for alloca-
tion of competence adopted by the Notice on Cooperation with NCAs, OJ. 313/3, at 7,
33-34 (1997) ("Some cases considered by the Commission to be of particular Com-
munity interest will more often be dealt with by the Commission.... This category
includes cases which raise a new point of law, that is to say, those which have not yet
been the subject of a Commission decision or a judgment of the Court of Justice or
Court of First Instance"). See also Alexander Schaub, EC Competition System-Proposals for
Reform, in 1998 FORDHAm CORP. L. INST. 129, 148-152 (Barry Hawk ed., 1999) (stating
that principal aim of reform should be "to substantially reduce the number of...
notifications" by eliminating authorization system set up by Regulation 17).
28. See, e.g., Nathalie Jalabert-Doury, Livre Blanc sur la Modernisation de l'Application
des Articles 81 & 82, RDAI/IBLJ, 505 n.505 (1999) (on file with the author). It states
that:
si l'on peut comprendre que la Commission doit avoir vocation A traiter de
questions diffrentes suivant les domaines concems et la nouveaut6 de
l'affaire, on ne saurait non plus admettre que l'6ventualit6 de discriminations
sur la base du caractre novateur ou non du dossier et une absence de
prrvisibilit et de contr6le sur la manirre dont la Commission drcide de
l'attribution des dossiers.
Id.
29. See White Paper, supra note 1, O.J. C 132/1, at 23, 90 (1999) ("[iun the new
Regulation applying Articles [81] and [82] . . . the Commission intends to make provi-
sion for a new kind of individual decision, subject to the ordinary publication require-
ments, in which the Commission would take note of the commitments entered into by
the parties and render them binding").
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outside the block exemptions"' ° or to "confirm the approach"
set out in its notices and guidelines," l would be merely declara-
tory, and would have "the same legal effect as negative clearance
decisions have at present. '3 2 In other words, the Commission's
positive decisions would not be binding.33  Accordingly, any
NCA could take a different view and any national court could
declare the same agreement void under Article 81 (2) -a highly
undesirable result not only from the point of view of legal cer-
tainty for the undertakings involved, but also because of the po-
tential for inconsistency in the application of EC competition
law. Such a result would also appear inconsistent with the fact
that block exemptions will be binding on NCAs unless the whole
or part of the NCAs' territory constitutes a separate market.3 4 It
would appear illogical if an NCA could take a decision that dif-
fers from an individual Commission decision but not one that
withdraws the protection of a block exemption.
In any event, when "a transaction raises a question that is
new" it appears more reasonable that companies should receive
some prior guidance that they are not violating competition law,
instead of being left in uncertainty until a complainant decides
to raise the issue. This applies particularly to agreements that
could be found compatible with Article 81 if certain modifica-
tions were proposed or undertakings given. Companies should
have the option of discussing their plans with the Commission
and the right to obtain legal certainty that their agreement will
be enforceable if they modify it to alleviate concern expressed by
the Commission. For this reason, under the directly applicable
exception system proposed here, undertakings would be free to
notify their agreements and to obtain a Commission decision
whenever they needed guidance on the applicability of Article
81(3).
Time limits are needed to avoid legal uncertainty. One of
30. Id., O.J. C 132/1, at 21, 78 (1999).
31. Id., O.J. C 132/1, at 22, 86 (1999).
32. Id., O.J. C 132/1, at 23, 89 (1999). It appears somewhat disingenuous for the
Commission to claim that the practice of non-binding comfort letters has "won general
acceptance." Id., O.J. C 132/1, at 12, 1 35 (1999). Companies are not generally satis-
fied with these decisions but face the reality that they simply have no other option.
33. Notice on Cooperation between National Courts and the Commission in Ap-
plying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, O.J. C 39/6, at 8, 20 (1993); see also
KERSE, supra note 27, at 247.
34. White Paper, supra note 1, OJ. C 132/1, at 23, 95 (1999).
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the main concerns companies currently raise about the Article
81 procedure is that there is no time limit on Commission deci-
sions (or even on the issuance of a comfort letter), and that com-
panies tend not to obtain any guidance for their agreement
before several years have passed. In fact, many of our clients
have been involved in notification procedures that have lasted
several years.
C. Inconsistent Application of Community Law
In its discussion of the risk of inconsistency in the applica-
tion of the competition rules, the White Paper identifies two po-
tential kinds of conflict: (i) where an NCA or national court
takes a favorable view of an agreement that is prohibited by the
Commission; and (ii) where the Commission takes a favorable
view of an agreement, but a national court or NCA prohibits it.
The White Paper's analysis seems to ignore the possibility of con-
flicts between national courts and NCAs in different Member
States.3 5 Yet this is the greatest risk associated with the Commis-
sion's proposals.
There exists inconsistency between the Commission and the
Member States. With respect to coordination between the Com-
mission and the Member States, the White Paper proposes a sys-
tem of informal cooperation and coordination that would rely
heavily on the reasonableness of all concerned. 6 As Commis-
sion decisions would be binding in only very few instances, and
as NCA decisions would at most be binding within the territory
of the respective Member State, contradictory decisions would
likely occur. NCAs, which do not fall under the definition of
"court or tribunal" within the meaning of Article 234 of the EC
Treaty, could not ask Community courts for a preliminary rul-
ing. If their decisions were appealed through several instances
in national courts, then it might take many years until the appli-
35. This is so unless the vague reference to the reinforced role of the Advisory
Committee is meant to avoid conflicts between the decisions of different NCAs.
36. White Paper, supra note 1, O.J. C 132/1, at 26, 107 (1999). It is also not
certain that the system would reduce the Commission's workload in cases that it deems
comparatively insignificant. This means that not only every NCA that intends to apply
Articles 81 or 82, but also every national court before which Article 81 or 82 is invoked,
must inform the Commission, even in "clear" cases. The Commission's workload is
unlikely to be reduced significantly. Id., O.J. C 132/1, at 26, 107 (1999).
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cation of Article 81 would then be tested by the court, if, indeed,
it ever was tested.
There also exists an inconsistency among Member States.
NCAs are not currently bound by the legal determinations of
other NCAs. Accordingly, inconsistency may arise where NCAs
in different Member States investigate the same (type of) agree-
ment or practice and apply different legal interpretations of Arti-
cle 81. The White Paper proposal is likely to increase the risk of
discrepancies by permitting NCAs and national courts to apply
Article 81(3). Even in cases where all NCAs investigating an
agreement declare Article 81(3) applicable, they might ask for
different undertakings.
Even after more than thirty years of application of Regula-
tion 17, inconsistent application of Community law by the Mem-
ber States is still a real danger. Many Member States have a very
short history of competition law enforcement. At present only
half of the NCAs are specifically empowered under their na-
tional laws to apply Articles 81 and 82. Article 81 (3), which the
Commission has a monopoly to apply, leaves particularly wide
areas of interpretation that may easily be influenced by political
value judgments.18 The expected enlargement of the Commu-
nity is likely to add further potential for conflict between the
interpretations of different NCAs.39
Inconsistency in the application of Article 81(3) could have
serious effects, with consequences for the fundamental aims of
European Community law. On the one hand, forum shopping is
37. See Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law, Current Practice and Future Pros-
pects, Discussion Paper prepared for the meeting of the Working Group on Competi-
tion Law on October 8 and 9, 1998 in Berlin, 16 (on file with the author). These
countries are Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and
Spain. Id. Denmark and Ireland do not consider specific empowerment to be neces-
sary. Id.
38. John Temple Lang, European Community Constitutional Law and the Enforcement of
Community Antitrust Law, 1993 FORDHAM CoRP. L. INST. 525, 599 (Barry Hawk ed.,
1994). In this connection, John Temple Lang raises the issue that "in some Member
States the power to grant exemptions under Article 85 (3) would be used for protection-
ist purposes." Id.
39. See White Paper, supra note 1, O.J. C 132/1, at 7, 7 (1999). Interestingly, the
Commission refers to future enlargement only to the extent that this might lead to
additional cases of cartels and abuses of dominant positions. Id., OJ. C 132/1, at 7, 7
(1999). It would appear that the "tradition of the planned economy" would also create
difficulties for NCAs in the new Member States to apply fully the acquis communautaire.
Id., O.J. C 132/1, at 7, 7 (1999).
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likely to be encouraged, if not for notifications, which the Com-
mission wants to abolish, then for complaints. This is particu-
larly true if the rights of companies with interests contrary to
those of the parties to the agreement, which presently are very
different in different Member States, are not harmonized. Also,
if an NCA tends to prohibit certain forms of agreement, then it
will discourage undertakings from concluding this type of agree-
ment relating to that Member State, encouraging a partitioning
of the internal market. If the benefits of the Commission propo-
sal are to be realized, then safeguards must be established to en-
sure that the newly competent bodies apply Article 81 (3) consist-
ently, and to avoid the adverse effects described above.
With regard to national courts, under the present system
where the Commission is already seized of a matter, the national
court has a duty under Article 10 to avoid inconsistent decisions
and can suspend proceedings before it requests information
from the Commission. Also, under the Convention on Jurisdic-
tion and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial
Matters ("Brussels Convention") if cases involving the same
cause of action between the same parties are brought in the
courts of different Contracting States, the courts seized after the
first must stay their proceedings under Article 21 of the Brussels
Convention.4" Article 22 of the Brussels Convention', however,
confers discretion on national courts to stay proceedings pend-
ing the outcome of hearings in related matters in another coun-
try.41 Thus, the lis pendens rule would not necessarily prevent
contradictory findings relating to the same agreement if, for ex-
ample, different complainants are involved. It certainly does not
preclude inconsistent approaches with respect to the same types
of agreements and practices.
Thus, if there is no longer a possibility for companies to no-
tify agreements because they fear that they might otherwise face
simultaneous litigation in a number of countries (because, e.g.,
different competitors might sue), then an overall increase in ju-
dicial cost and time would occur and the danger of conflicting
judgments in different Member States would arise.42
40. See Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, O.J. C 189/1 (1990), 29 I.L.M. 1413, 1423, art. 21.
41. See id., 29 I.L.M. at 1423-24, art. 22.
42. The only case in which inconsistent rulings would be prevented would be if the
first case had an Article 234 reference, since any subsequent ruling by any national
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IV. PROPOSAL FOR A REVISED SYSTEM
A. Outline of the System
The Commission should introduce the proposed system of
legal exception. There is little doubt that the current central-
ized authorization system-which imposes an obligation to no-
tify each time a company wishes to invoke Article 81 (3)-creates
a large workload both for the Commission and for undertakings.
The fact that non-notified agreements are treated as void under
Article 81 (2) as soon as they come within the scope of Article
81(1) has been a significant source of legal uncertainty for un-
dertakings. The Commission's proposal to introduce a system
whereby Article 81(3) can be applied by any NCA and national
court must therefore be welcomed. This proposal does not nec-
essarily imply, however, that companies should also be deprived
of the possibility of notifying agreements when they need to ob-
tain some guidance from the Commission or an NCA as to the
compatibility of their agreement with Article 81.
There must, however, still be an option of notifying agree-
ments to the Commission. There will continue to be cases in
which undertakings have a legitimate interest in obtaining legal
certainty about their agreements if they do not fall into any of
the clear. categories defined by block exemptions or Commission
decisions and require significant investments or are expected to
attract strong complaints. Companies must have the option of
notifying these agreements and the Commission should be
obliged to deal with them in a reasonable time frame. In the
case of production of joint ventures, the Commission itself rec-
ognizes that an agreement that is the basis for significant invest-
ments may require that there be an option to notify to have its
validity examined ex ante.4"
Moreover, the Commission must decide on notified agree-
ments within certain time limits. The experience under the
Merger Regulation has shown that one month suffices to carry
out a thorough investigation that permits a decision on whether
serious doubts as to the compatibility of a proposed agreement
with EC law exists or whether the agreement raises no such
court would have to conform to the ruling given. National courts are, however, unlikely
to refer to the court in the majority of cases.
43. White Paper, supra note 1, O.J. C 132/1, at 21, 1 79 (1999).
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doubts. There does not appear to be any reason why the Com-
mission should not be able to perform a similar assessment of
Article 81 cases within a comparably short time.4 4 The same ap-
plies with respect to the in-depth investigation that the Merger
Task Force performs within four months. Considering DG IV's
current backlog of cases, these time limits could be slightly in-
creased for Article 81 cases.
Accordingly, after notification, the Commission would have
a fixed time limit (e.g., two months) to decide on exercising one
of several options, namely: (i) dealing with the case itself by issu-
ing an opinion similar in form to a comfort letter; (ii) deciding
to open an in-depth investigation; or (iii) referring the case to
one of the NCAs for an in-depth investigation. 41 If the Commis-
sion decides to open an in-depth investigation, then this would
lead to a decision declaring the agreement compatible or incom-
patible with Article 81 within a specified period (e.g., six
months). If the Commission does not adopt a decision before
expiry of the first two month period, then this should, at the
most, have the effect that comfort letters have at present. The
Commission should also be entitled to terminate the "second
phase" early if a short investigation reveals that the agreement in
question does not violate Article 81 after all. In this case, one
could think of simplifying the procedure for adopting a deci-
sion.
Notifications would be forwarded to Member States for
treatment under Article 81 if the notified agreements are na-
tional in character. Any application of Community law by NCAs
would need to be made permissible by national law.46 This
44. Frank Montag, The Case for a Reform of Regulation 17/62: Problems and Possible
Solutions from a Practitioner's Point of View, 1998 FoRDHAm CoRP. L. INST. 157 (Barry Hawk
ed., 1999).
45. See IBM v. Commission, Case 60/81, [1981] E.C.R. 2639, 2653, 18, [1981] 3
C.M.L.R. 635, 660 (stating that by depriving NCAs ofjurisdiction under Article 9(3) of
Regulation 17, Commission's statement of objections had not adversely affected IBM's
position because purpose of Article 9 (3) is to protect undertaking concerned from par-
allel proceedings brought by NCAs). The decisions under (ii) and (iii) would not be
subject to review as they are mere preparatory acts. Id.
46. SeeJohn Temple Lang, General Report on the Application of Community Competition
Law on Enterprises by National Courts and National Authorities, June 18, 1998 (on file with
the author). At the present time, only eight NCAs have the express power under na-
tional law to apply Articles 81(1) and 82. While arguably there may be no need for
express empowering legislation, there would still be a need for implementing legisla-
tion. Id.
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would also be required under the Commission's proposal.
If a case is passed to an NCA that is better placed to deal
with it, then the NCA to which the case is forwarded would need
to receive all documents that were submitted to the Commission
and would be able to use them directly as evidence.47 This
would require a modification of Article 20 of Regulation 17, and
would lead to a reversal of the Spanish Banks decision.48 The
utmost importance would need to be attributed to introducing
safeguards ensuring that the information is kept confidential,
and does not go beyond the Commission and the NCA assigned
to the case. It should also be noted that at present, procedural
rules in the Member States are very different, so that evidence
collected by one NCA could well be inadmissible under the rules
of another.49
Instances in which the Commission can send notifications
to the Member States must be well-defined. In a system of con-
current jurisdictions, the most effective means of preventing the
risk of multiple proceedings and conflicting decisions is the cre-
ation of rules on allocation of competence.5" These rules should
be flexible, but nevertheless avoid legal uncertainty. With re-
spect to the application of Articles 81(1) and 82, the Commis-
sion and the Member States appear to agree that NCAs should
concern -themselves only with cases that are mainly national in
character. National competence is easy to determine for agree-
ments between undertakings from one Member State, and
which, although they do not relate to imports or exports be-
tween Member States, may affect intra-Community trade. Even
if those elements are not present, agreements, however, may
have a national character justifying a transfer of the notification
to an NCA. 1
The Commission specifically rejects certain rules that might
be used in allocating competence between itself and NCAs. It
considers the "center of gravity" theory too vague. It also consid-
47. White Paper, supra note 1, O.J. C 132/1, at 24, 96 (1999).
48. Direcci6n General de Defensa de la Competencia v. Asociaci6n Espanola de
Banca Privada (AEB) and Others, Case C-67/91, [1992] E.C.R. 1-4785, [1991-1993
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 96, 597.
49. But seeJalabert-Doury, supra note 28, at 497.
50. See Pierre-Vincent Bos, Towards a Clear Distribution of Competence Between EC and
National Competition Authorities; 16 EUR. CoM. L.R. 410 (1995).
51. Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law, supra note 37, at 27.
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ers that the turnover thresholds in the Merger Regulation can-
not serve as an example for cases under Article 81 because
under the Merger Regulation they are applied to establish both
the scope of application of Community law and the exclusive
competence of the Commission. 52 This wholesale rejection of
turnover thresholds merits comment.53 For example, the turno-
ver thresholds under Article 1(2) of the Merger Regulation must
be read in conjunction with the two-thirds rule, and the thresh-
olds under Article 1(3) specifically require that undertakings
have turnover of a certain significance in at least three Member
States. A two-thirds (or three-quarters) rule, possibly combined
with an absolute turnover threshold, should be discussed, as this
solution would have the distinct advantages of simplicity and pre-
dictability.
A possibility could be created of notifying on Form A/B di-
rectly to NCAs. An alternative to a Commission monopoly on
accepting notifications and then forwarding them to NCAs ap-
propriately, would be to permit undertakings to notify their
agreements on Form A/B directly to an NCA. If this possibility
were created, a time limit would need to be imposed on NCAs to
decide whether to: (i) open proceedings; (ii) refer the case to
the Commission if the case raises a new issue or if the Commis-
sion would be best placed to deal with the application because
the effects of the agreement will be felt in more than one Mem-
ber State; (iii) refer the case to another NCA, if the latter is best
placed to deal with the case;54 or (iv) adopt a non-binding deci-
sion because the agreement does not raise serious competition
concern.
In any case, the NCA would need to send a copy of the noti-
fication to the Commission immediately after receipt to enable
the Commission to withdraw the case from the NCA.55 Follow-
ing a notification, only one NCA should be entitled to decide on
52. See White Paper, supra note 1, O.J. C 132/1, at 18, 61-62 (1999).
53. In fact, for purposes of attributing jurisdiction over a case in which neither of
the parties is an EU national or has an establishment in the EU, meeting the turnover
threshold creates a presumption that the transaction creates a sufficient effect in the
Community.
54. Adequate remedies could be introduced to resolve conflicts ofjurisdiction that
could arise when an NCA, to which the file is passed, expressly refuses to deal with it. It
could happen that the NCA, to which the file is passed, might decide to send the file
back to the first NCA.
55. Cooperation will be discussed below.
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a certain agreement, decision, or concerted practice. Of course,
this solution might require Member State legislation not only
permitting application of Articles 81 and 82 by NCAs but also
providing for notification mechanisms under these provisions.
To ensure uniform application of EC law, the Commission
would be allowed to withdraw jurisdiction from an NCA at any
time before the latter has adopted a decision. This could occur
in situations where the NCA "is liable to find that there has been
no infringement of Articles 81 or 82 or of its national competi-
tion law,"56 as well as where the NCA is liable to find that an
infringement has arisen although Article 81(3) should clearly
apply.
Opinions of the Commission arrived at without an in-depth
investigation should be non-binding. Opinions would not be
binding on NCAs or national courts although they should be
taken into account by both whenever they must decide on the
validity of the agreement in question. 7 They would also not be
subject to review by EC courts because of their preparatory char-
acter.18 The same applies to decisions to refer the case to one of
the NCAs. If the Commission does not adopt a decision before
expiry of the time limit, then this should have the effect that
comfort letters have at present.
On the other hand, Commission decisions arrived at after
an in-depth investigation must be binding. Legal certainty re-
quires that in all cases where the Commission has engaged in an
in-depth investigation, a decision must be taken that is binding
throughout the Community and appealable in court.
While as a result of the proposed reform package the
number of notifications will be reduced significantly so that the
Commission should be able to cope with them within the dead-
lines mentioned above, a number of amendments to the present
decision making process might reduce the administrative bur-
56. Notice on Cooperation with NCAs, O.J. C 313/3, at 11, 1 62 (1997).
57. See id., O.J. C 313/3, at 6, 121 (1997). Thus, if the Commission had issued an
exemption comfort letter, then it would expect NCAs to consult with it before they
decided to adopt a different decision. Id., O.J. C 313/3, at 6, 21 (1997).
58. See IBM, [1981] E.C.R. at 2653-54, 11 18, 21, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. at 660-61 (stat-
ing that, by depriving NCAs of jurisdiction under Article 9(3) of Regulation 17, Com-
mission's statement of objections had not adversely affected IBM's position because
purpose of Article 9(3) is to protect undertaking concerned from parallel proceedings
brought by NCAs).
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den on the Commission. The Commission could contemplate
some of the procedures that it discusses (and rejects as insuffi-
cient) in the White Paper, such as reducing the number of lan-
guages in which Notices pursuant to Article 19(3) of Regulation
17 are published and simplifying Advisory Committee consulta-
tions.59 In addition, by analogy to the approach in first phase
decisions under the Merger Regulation, the Commission could
delegate its power to adopt decisions to the Competition Com-
missioner. This should only apply in clear-cut cases (e.g., where
the Commission begins an in-depth investigation but closes the
case in less than three months).'
NCA decisions following a referral from the Commission
and arrived at after an in-depth investigation must be binding
throughout the EU. NCA decisions applying EC law should have
binding effect in all Member States. This is essential to provide
legal certainty to companies and ensure harmonious develop-
ment of EC law in the Member States.
Decisions by NCAs under Article 81 could be made binding
in different Member States in several ways. The simplest option
is a system where Member State decisions are submitted to the
Commission in draft form and adopted as Commission decisions
unless the Commission intervenes and takes over the case.6 1 An-
other option, somewhat more difficult to implement, is to pro-
vide for mutual recognition of these cases under a multilateral
treaty, comparable with the Brussels Convention, or a Regula-
tion.62
If a decision by an NCA becomes a decision by the Commis-
sion through the Commission's (express or implied) endorse-
59. White Paper, supra note 1, O.J. C 132/1, at 18-19, 66 (1999).
60. But see Montag, supra note 44, at 177-78.
61. But see Mario Siragusa, The Lowering of the Thresholds: An Opportunity To Harmo-
nise Merger Control, 14 EUR. CoM. L.R. 139, 140 (1993).
62. See Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law, supra note 37, at 43. The
Bundeskartellamt considers that neither step may be required because a mere amend-
ment of Regulation 17 would be sufficient. Id. In this connection a comparison is
drawn with Article 9(8) of the Merger Regulation and the arguments of a number of
German commentators that suggest that any decision by an NCA that is the conse-
quence of a referral under this provision automatically has Community effect. Langen
Bunte Kart, Merger Regulation Article 9, 19. This issue, however, has not yet been de-
cided authoritatively and might provoke significant debate. If there were no specific
endorsement by the Commission, then Member States might well object that they have
given up parts of their sovereignty on behalf of the Community and not on behalf of
other Member States.
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ment, then this also means that recourse to the Court of First
Instance and the European Court of Justice is available.63 This
guarantees harmonious development of EC competition law. It
also permits NCAs to gain greater experience with such law,
which is a good preparation for further decentralization at a
later stage.
Cooperation among NCAs and between NCAs and the Com-
mission must be strengthened. Under a decentralized system,
cooperation among NCAs and between NCAs and the Commis-
sion is essential not only to decide which NCA is best placed for
a case, but also to allow the NCAs to investigate effectively when
information of the territory of different Member States is neces-
sary. A reinforced role for the Advisory Committee could help
ensure adequate distribution among the NCAs of cases involving
application of EC competition law. Once one NCA is desig-
nated, all other NCAs would be obliged to collaborate with it on
the basis of rules similar to those laid down by Articles 11 and 13
of Regulation 17.64
National courts can apply Article 81(3) but must stay pro-
ceedings if the agreement under dispute is reported to the Com-
mission. For national courts, the legal exemption system means
that they will automatically be entitled to apply Article 81 in its
entirety. This also means that, in the absence of a binding deci-
sion on the agreement, they must examine the agreement under
the competitive conditions existing at the time of the judgment.
While national courts could not pronounce an agreement valid
only for a limited period of time after the judgment, they could
conclude that an agreement fulfilled the criteria of Article 81 (3)
in the past, but that it no longer does.
In determining the legality of an agreement, national courts
would be bound by Commission decisions taken after an in-
depth investigation (even if they were taken by a Member State
on behalf of the Commission) and by existing block exemptions.
63. If an NCA decision is considered to be a delegated decision of the Commis-
sion, then the remedy would be an action under Article 230, which would be more
direct and efficient.
64. Under Article 11 of Regulation 17, the Commission can obtain all necessary
information from governments, NCAs, and directly from undertakings and associations
of undertakings. Under Article 13 of Regulation 17, NCAs may be requested by the
Commission to assist its officials in an investigation in their territories, or even to under-
take an investigation themselves on the Commission's behalf.
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If, during the proceedings, one of the parties to the agreement
under scrutiny decided to notify the agreement to the Commis-
sion, then the case would be stayed for that period. While this
might delay court proceedings, it would save on litigation time
and cost if another dispute arose in front of another national
court in the same or different Member State. Also, to the extent
that the Commission's decision was subject to time limits, any
delay would be insubstantial.
If a complaint is filed under Articles 81 or 82, then only one
NCA should deal with the case. The easiest way to avoid double
procedures is to permit only the Commission to accept com-
plaints under Articles 81 or 82, or to, at least, use the Commis-
sion as a clearing house distributing cases that are filed with one
of the NCAs. The Commission should determine within a two
month time frame after receipt of a complaint whether to: (i)
reject the complaint as obviously unfounded; (ii) refer it to an
authority better suited to deal with the complaint under the
rules for attributing cases; or (iii) enter into an investigation of
the complaint. In scenarios (ii) and (iii), the relevant authority
should have six months from the time the information is materi-
ally complete to decide on the complaint. The rules on attribut-
ing cases to the authority best equipped to deal with a case could
be the same as those to be established for notifications.
One alternative is to permit complaints under Articles 81
and 82 to be filed with each NCA. The NCA then must take
decisions corresponding to those outlined for the Commission
within a period of two months. The NCA receiving the com-
plaint must inform the Commission and the other NCAs of the
complaint. The NCA that first received the complaint would
make the decision on which is the most appropriate authority.
The other NCAs would be restrained from taking any decision
on the case. This system requires a high degree of coordination,
which, in the age of the Internet, might be feasible, assuming
the NCAs established a freely accessible database into which they
would enter any new cases upon receipt.
The end result of the system should be that only one NCA
would make a decision, which would become binding in all
Member States under the system described above for decisions
following notification.6" If the Commission or an NCA initiates a
65. See Notice on Cooperation with NCAs, OJ. C 313/3, at 4, 10 (1997). The
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proceeding, then the other NCAs should be barred from dealing
with the case. The rules dealing with complaint procedures, par-
ticularly those dealing with the appropriate authority's decision
to investigate a case, should apply to their own initiative proceed-
ings mutatis mutandis.
The Merger Regulation could be applied to partial function
joint ventures such as production joint ventures. In line with the
White Paper proposal, partial-function production joint ventures
could be treated under the Merger Regulation. 6 If this rule is
implemented, for reasons of legal certainty, then consideration
must also be given to applying the Merger Regulation to other
types of partial function joint ventures that require investments
above a certain threshold.
Of course, treatment of joint ventures under the Merger
Regulation would be less necessary if the regime enforcing Arti-
cle 81 could provide sufficient legal certainty within a reasonable
time frame. At the same time, there does not seem to be any
reason why, as the White Paper argues, these notifications must
necessarily be made compulsory. If undertakings decide not to
notify agreements that involve significant investments-with the
consequence that they later have to undo the transaction if it is
found to violate Article 81-then they do so at their own risk.67
B. Effects of the Proposed System
The proposed system would abolish a priori illegality,
mandatory notification, and exemption monopoly of Commis-
sion. The abolition of the authorization system would remove
the stigma of illegality of numerous agreements that raise little
or no risk of anti-competitive impact and enable companies to
avoid the excessive compliance costs of the present system.
The new system would also reduce the Commission's
caseload. Before the Commission began to introduce measures
Commission itself states that " [ f]or cases falling within the scope of Community law...
checks should wherever possible be carried out by a single authority (either a Member
State's competition authority or the Commission). Control by a single authority offers
advantages for business." Id., O.J. C 313/3
66. White Paper, supra note 1, O.J. C 132/1, at 19, 79 (1999).
67. Moreover, while notifications to DG IV should be reduced to permit the staff
to focus on the most serious infringements of Articles 81 and 82, the reform should not
cause the staff of the Merger Task Force, which is providing a much valued service to
undertakings, to become overwhelmed by additional notifications.
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to reduce its caseload, only approximately 200 cases were noti-
fied per year. If no far-reaching reforms were introduced, then
the number of notifications that could be expected in the future
would already be smaller than in the past. This is because full
function cooperative joint ventures are treated under the
Merger Regulation, and because the reform of Article 4(2) of
Regulation 17 removes the incentive from companies to notify
agreements containing vertical restraints for the purpose of
avoiding fines (or negative national court decisions) in cases
where the restrictions clearly fall under Article 81 (3). Estimates
indicate that the combined effect of both measures should be a
reduction in "simple" notifications of approximately twenty five
percent. The new vertical restraints block exemption will, hope-
fully, further diminish uncertainty and lead to a reduction in no-
tifications.
If a system of legal exception were introduced, then there
would be significantly fewer cases in which companies would feel
a need to notify their agreements to the Commission. As na-
tional courts could apply Article 81 (3), there would no longer be
an incentive to notify undertakings whose agreements were
likely to be found exemptable under Article 81(3). While the
introduction of time limits for the Commission might increase a
company's incentive to file notifications, this would not apply to
"easy cases" because companies would know the Commission
would close such cases with non-binding opinions.
Under the proposed system, there would also be little incen-
tive to engage in dilatory notifications. If a case did not raise any
new or difficult question of law, then all that would be won by
notifying in the course of an ongoing litigation would be two
months, until a non-binding Commission decision was taken. If
a case is complicated, then the harmonious development of
Community law requires that there be no conflicting decisions
in different Member States, and that a procedure is imple-
mented that leads to a Commission decision binding in all Mem-
ber States that would settle the case and prevent further litiga-
tion concerning the same agreement. The incentive for compa-
nies, whose agreements contain truly questionable provisions to
notify while a national court proceeding is pending, would be
limited in practice. They might prefer to obtain a negative deci-
sion in one national court in order to draw the Commission's
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attention to their agreement and to risk paying fines amounting
to ten percent of their turnover.
The proposed system would also establish legal certainty for
undertakings legitimately concerned about the validity of their
agreements. A notification system under which companies are
ensured that the Commission will investigate their agreements
creates the necessary legal certainty that is needed if companies
are to make significant investments.
Time limits introduced by the Commission will further in-
crease legal certainty. The White Paper acknowledges a need for
time limits with regard to complainants. It states that complain-
ants "need to know quickly whether the Commission will be tak-
ing up their complaint." The Commission therefore proposes
the introduction of a time limit of four months, by the end of
which the complainant will need to be informed whether the
Commission will carry out an investigation or reject the com-
plaint.68 In the case of notifications, time limits serve the same
purpose. To ensure legal certainty, notifying undertakings need
to know within a certain period whether the Commission will
initiate proceedings, refer the case to the NCA best positioned to
handle the application, or issue a non-binding decision because
the agreement does not raise serious competition concern.
Finally, an important element of legal certainty is a com-
pany's ability to rely on the decision of one authority-the Com-
mission, or, as the case may be, an NCA-and be able to trust
that no other authority will foster a different opinion. In cases
that do not raise any new legal question, this purpose can be
served with non-binding opinions that will be duly considered in
national courts and by NCAs. In cases that raise difficult new
questions, a binding and appealable decision is required. The
new system would also create partial decentralization with a lim-
ited risk of inconsistent case law. The proposed system would
lead to national court and NCA application of Article 81 in its
entirety. This, alone, should encourage NCAs to apply Commu-
nity rather than national competition rules (including outside
the scope of notifications).
Once national laws are adjusted, NCAs and national courts
that have yet to apply EC competition law will begin doing so. As
decisions by NCAs under EC law would be treated like EC deci-
68. White Paper, supra note 1, O.J. C 132/1, at 28-29, 120 (1999).
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sions, there would be simple and, compared with national sys-
tems, fast ways to appeal them to the Court of First Instance and
obtain certainty about open legal questions.69 NCAs would gain
experience in the application of EC law, which could prepare
them for further-reaching decentralization in the future, while
avoiding inconsistencies to a large extent.
The proposed system would also eliminate or diminish
problems of enforcing cross-border decisions. If the Commis-
sion adopts an NCA decision through the Commission's express
or implied endorsement, then this also means that it could be
enforced in the national courts of all Member States and that no
other NCA could investigate the agreement. In addition, the sys-
tem would provide a combination of different well-established
procedures. The proposal outlined above is based on elements
of existing procedures, in particular the Merger Regulation,
which should increase its acceptance in the Member States and
in the business community. Moreover, it would also provide
benefits for competition enforcement and for undertakings in
the European Community. The proposal would not only unite a
decrease in the Commission's notification-related workload with
an increase in legal certainty and decentralization, but should
also be welcomed by companies that would have a choice to in-
vest in obtaining greater legal certainty or to accept the risks of
procedures before national courts.
V. THE COMPLEMENTARY REFORMS PROPOSED BY
THE COMMISSION
The Commission's proposal to increase its investigative pow-
ers raises serious concerns from the point of view of the protec-
tion of individuals' and companies' fundamental rights, includ-
ing their rights of defense and the policy on in-house counsel
legal privilege. The White Paper contains no proposals dealing
with these issues.
A. Increased Investigative Powers for the Commission
The White Paper makes several proposals for strengthening
the Commission's investigative powers. First, it proposes that, in
69. As noted, if an NCA decision is considered a delegated Commission decision,
then the remedy would be an action under Article 230, which would be more direct and
efficient.
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the course of an investigation under Article 14(3) of Regulation
17, Commission officials should be able to ask the undertakings'
representatives or staff any question that is justified by and re-
lated to the purpose of the investigation. Minuted statements of
answers given in response to such questioning would be in-
cluded in the case-file and used as evidence in the proceedings.
Second, the Commission would prefer that the current system of
national authorization of Commission investigations, under Arti-
cle 14(3) of Regulation 17, is centralized under the jurisdiction
of one of the EC courts. Finally, the Commission proposes that
it should be empowered to summon, sua sponte, anyone who can
likely provide helpful information to its inquiries, and to take
minuted statements. These proposals dramatically increase the
fact-finding powers of the Commission without limiting the ex-
tent to which those questioned might be required to answer cer-
tain questions or the use to which the evidence might be put.
1. The Commission's Proposals for Oral Questioning of
Company Officials Are Disproportionate and Unnecessary
The proposed system would broaden the scope of the Com-
mission's current fact-gathering powers. 70 There are currently
two means by which the Commission can obtain information
from an undertaking when conducting an investigation under
Regulation 17. First, under Article 11 of Regulation 17, the
Commission can address a Request for Information to any un-
dertaking. Typically, the Request for Information is addressed
to the undertaking in writing and responded to in writing.71 Sec-
ond, the Commission may conduct investigations or "dawn
raids" under Article 14 of Regulation 17, involving the attend-
ance by Commission officials at the premises of an undertaking.
Commission officials may examine business records, take copies
of documents, demand immediate oral explanations from the
employees, and enter the premises of an undertaking. The only
present Commission power to direct oral questioning at officials
of undertakings is the power to ask for an immediate oral expla-
70. See generally KERSE, supra note 27, chap. 3.
71. The undertaking is not obliged to respond to the Commission's request in the
first instance since, to compel an undertaking to answer, the Commission is required to
adopt a decision under Article 11(5) of Regulation 17.
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nation pursuant to Article 14(1) (c) of Regulation 17, in the
course of a dawn raid.
Presently, the Commission's powers of oral inquiry are quite
limited. It has never been made expressly clear by the European
Court of Justice whether the power to ask oral questions under
Article 14(1) (c) of Regulation 17 is restricted to requesting ex-
planations of the books and other business records that the
Commission is examining in the course of its investigations. The
better view, as confirmed by the Commission's established prac-
tice, is that Commission officials are not generally permitted to
interview company officials.72 Rather, any questioning should be
limited to specific and concrete questions arising from the actual
or related documents under examination. The reason for this
limitation reflects the fact that the Commission's powers under
Articles 11 and 14 of Regulation 17 are not co-extensive. While
Article 11 foresees that undertakings may be afforded a reason-
able period of time (typically two to four weeks) in which to re-
spond to a request for information (perhaps after taking legal
advice), the Commission's powers under Article 14(1) (c) envis-
age immediate and spontaneous answers to questioning that oc-
curs over a very short period. As a matter of law, therefore, any
proposed extension to the power to request oral explanations
under Article 14(1) (c) should not be used to undermine the
clear safeguards contained in Article 11. This is implicitly ac-
cepted by the Commission in its guidelines for Dealing with the
Commission: "IT]he power [Article 14(1) (c)] should not be used
to pressure the officials of a firm into making oral admissions
that they would not wish to make if they had the time for reflec-
tion afforded to them by a written request under Article 11."
In proposing greater powers of oral inquiry, the White Pa-
per ignores certain fundamental considerations. First, the Com-
mission fails to put forward any good reasons for departing from
the clear division of powers reflected in Articles 11 and 14(1) (c)
of Regulation 17. The fact that the Commission would prefer
greater investigative powers is not, of itself, decisive. Second, the
White Paper contains no reference to safeguards for those reply-
72. See National Panasonic (UK) Ltd. v. Commission, Case 136/79, [1980] E.C.R.
2033, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 169 (view expressed by Advocate General Warner); see also
KERSE, supra note 27, at 124-25. The Commission seems to have accepted this in its
pleadings in the case. KERsE, supra, at 125.
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ing to oral questioning, and no right to obtain legal advice both
for the company and for the person involved, in stark contrast to
the current safeguards under Article 11 and the Commission's
established practice under Article 14(1) (c). Third, any exten-
sion of the powers of oral inquiry is likely to prove counter-pro-
ductive.
There are good legal and common sense reasons why un-
dertakings should be afforded time to reflect on certain investi-
gative questions. These include the right to obtain legal advice
and the need to ensure that answers are complete, correct, and
not misleading. Accelerating this timetable and inducing or
compelling a premature response are likely to create as many
problems for the Commission as they are seeking to solve.7" The
proposed powers would far exceed powers granted under na-
tional laws. The proposed increase in Commission investigative
powers, particularly with regard to the power to take minuted
statements, would exceed considerably the present powers of
most NCAs.
The most recent confirmation of Member State thinking in
this respect is the Competition Act 1998 ("Act"), which radically
overhauls the majority of U.K. competition law and represents
the culmination of a long-standing and widespread review by
successive U.K. governments of antitrust enforcement policy and
powers in the EU and elsewhere. Under the Act, the power to
provide oral explanation is expressly linked to and limited to the
documents produced in response to a specific request for docu-
ment production by an investigating official of the Director Gen-
eral for Fair Trading ("DGFT"). In addition, any person re-
quired to give an oral explanation of a document produced in
response to a written request under Sections 26-27 of the Act
may be accompanied by a legal advisor.14 Although the DGFT
may require a person to produce specified documents or infor-
73. Undertakings might seek to challenge the Commission's minutes of oral state-
ments with their own version, repudiate employees' authority to make statements attrib-
uted to them, or try to correct the statements made.
74. The Competition Commission established under the Act is, inter alia, the ap-
pellate body for certain decisions of the Director General for Fair Trading ("DGFT").
In this respect, it may be likened to the Court of First Instance as the first route of
appeal in direct challenges to Commission decisions in antitrust matters. As these ap-
peals will be adversarial in nature, the Competition Commission, acting in its appellate
function, will be able to question individuals orally. The detailed procedural rules for
such examination have yet to be finalized.
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mation that is related to any matter relevant to the investigation,
or to explain what happened to that document or where it is, the
Act only allows for such information to be provided in writing.
Individuals answering questions are entitled to assert legal pro-
fessional privilege (which in the United Kingdom covers in-
house counsel communications as well as those from outside law-
yers) and the right not to incriminate oneself.
Similarly in France, company officials can only be required
to explain certain matters contained in documents seized. They
may, under certain circumstances, refuse to answer such ques-
tions. This applies irrespective of whether the explanations are
demanded in the context of an informal enquite simple or the
more formalized enquite lourde.75
In Germany, witness questioning requires a warrant that in-
forms witnesses of the topic of questioning. While the law does
not specify how long in advance the warrant must be served, it is
generally recognized that, at least in a procedure that may lead
to the imposition of fines, witnesses must have sufficient time to
prepare for their testimony and to consult with a lawyer. Com-
mentators consider that this also applies in the simple adminis-
trative proceeding. 76 Thus, ad hoc questioning is not permissi-
ble.
75. See Arrt France Loisirs, BOCCRF No. 13 (June 1, 1990) (on file with the au-
thor). In France there are two principal types of investigations, which are carried out
by the investigators of the Direction Gn6rale de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la
Repression des Fraudes and by the rapporteurs of the Conseil de la Concurrence, respectively.
These are (i) the informal enquite simple, and (ii) the more formalized enquite lourde.
The enquites simples are informal in the sense that investigating officials remain in a
conference room without the right of access to other part of the premises. Investigating
officials can ask for documents and orally question company officials "on the spot" re-
garding such documents. Documents can, however, be withheld and employees being
questioned can, within certain limits, refuse to answer questions, in particular those
questions that (i) do not seem to be manifestly connected with the object of the in-
quiry, and (ii) are directly incriminating. In practice, the investigating authorities do
not object to legal advice being taken. The enquite lourde is authorized by ajudge of the
Tribunal de Grand Instance. In addition to the powers afforded by an enquite simple, a
fully-authorized enqudte lourde allows the investigating officials to seize specified docu-
ments whether the undertaking subject to the investigation consents to such seizure or
not. Importantly, however, the investigating officials' powers of oral inquiry under the
enquite lourde procedure are identical to those under the enquite simple procedure. In a
1990judgment, the Paris Court of Appeal confirmed that undertakings are not, in an
antitrust investigation under French law, obliged to answer potentially incriminating
questions.
76. Also, a number of procedural safeguards protect the fundamental rights of
individuals, e.g., having to incriminate themselves or close relatives.
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In Italy, the scope of the questioning by the competition
authority is similarly limited to requesting an undertaking to
supply information in its possession and to exhibit any docu-
ments. In the course of the investigation, the officials can only
ask for clarifications. The powers of the Italian authorities are
governed by strict procedural warranties. The information col-
lected in the course of the investigation may be used only for the
purposes of the investigation.
It is therefore clear that the Commission's proposed in-
crease in investigative powers would exceed those applicable in
the above Member States in several respects: (i) oral question-
ing is not generally permitted; (ii) to the extent that it is allowed
at all, it is confined to explanations of the specific documents
under investigation; (iii) those questioned can generally refuse
to answer certain questions, in particular where answering would
expose them to a risk of self-incrimination; and (iv) legal advi-
sors may, in many cases, attend such questioning or at least be
consulted in advance.
The Commission proposal would violate the procedural
rights of undertakings being investigated. The above examples
of procedural rules governing competition investigations in the
Member States reflect general principles of law-of which funda-
mental rights form an integral part-that also apply to Commu-
nity institutions.77 The rights of the defense are a fundamental
principle. The European Court of Justice has determined that,
although it can lead to the imposition of fines, the procedure
under Regulation 17 is an administrative procedure. 78 However,
this does not mean that the Commission can ignore the rights of
the defense in undertakings under investigation. 79 On the con-
trary, the European Court of Justice has explicitly stated:
In interpreting Article 14 of Regulation 17, regard must be
had in particular to the rights of the defense, a principle
77. See Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 6(2), O.J. C
340/2, at 153 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 67 [hereinafter Consolidated TEU], incorporating
changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1; see also NV Nederlandsche Banden-
Industrie Michelin v. Commission, Case 322/81, [1983] E.C.R. 3461, 3498, 7, [1985] 1
C.M.L.R. 282, 318.
78. See, e.g., Buchler & Co. v. Commission, Case 44/69, [1970] E.C.R. 733, 753,
20, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8084.
79. See, e.g., SA Cimenteries CBR v. Commission, Joined Cases T-10/92, T-12/92,
T-15/92, [1992] E.C.R. 2667, 39; SA Musique Diffusion Fran~aise v. Commission,
Joined Cases 100-103/80, [1983] E.C.R. 1825, 7, [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 221, 315.
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whose fundamental nature has been stressed on numerous
occasions in the Court's decisions. 80
According to the European Court of Justice's consistent
practice, the rights of the defense must be observed in adminis-
trative procedures, which may lead to economic sanctions. The
observance of the rights of the defense extends to preliminary
inquiry procedures. In Hoechst, the European Court of Justice
ruled that it is necessary to prevent the rights of the defense
from being irremediably impaired during the preliminary in-
quiry procedures, and in particular, during investigations that
may be decisive in providing evidence of the unlawful nature of
conduct engaged in by undertakings for which they may be lia-
ble. Further expanding this line of reasoning, the European
Court of Justice declared in a subsequent case regarding Article
11 of Regulation 17 that even though the Commission is entitled
to compel an undertaking to provide and disclose all necessary
information, it may not, by means of a decision calling for infor-
mation, undermine the rights of the defense. The European
Court of Justice concluded:
Thus, the Commission may not compel an undertaking to
provide it with the answers which might involve an admission
on its part of the existence of an infringement which it is in-
cumbent upon the Commission to prove.8'
As a consequence, on the spot questioning of company offi-
cials could not be permitted, and certainly not without the pres-
ence of legal counsel. Certain limitations on the Commission's
powers of investigation are implied by the need to safeguard the
rights of the defense. In an on the spot interview, the rights of
defense of the company and the person involved could easily be
irremediably impaired. An on the spot interview would lack the
requisite procedural safeguards regarding witness interviews by
denying the interviewed individual sufficient and appropriate
notice to consider his or her response. Such an interview could
also contravene the European Convention on Human Rights
("European Convention"), to be respected by the EU through
80. See Hoechst AG v. Commission, Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, [1989] E.C.R.
2859, 2923, 14, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 410, 465; Michelin, [1983] E.C.R. at 3498, 7,
[1985] 1 C.M.L.R. at 318.
81. Orkem v. Commission, Case 374/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3283, 3351, 35, [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 502.
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Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and numerous Euro-
pean Court of Justice decisions.82 Although the Court has ruled
that the European Convention does not uphold the right not to
give evidence against oneself in the context of infringements of
competition law,83 it would apply to the individual, and the Eu-
ropean Convention may in general be relied upon by undertak-
ings subject to an investigation relating to competition law. The
proposed on the spot interviews would run counter to the Euro-
pean Convention, not necessarily because they would force an
interviewed individual to provide self-incriminating evidence,
but because the appropriate rights of the defense under general
principles of law regarding the witness interviews would be
wholly denied.
If witnesses are summoned to the Commission, at least the
following provisions should apply: (i) the summons must indi-
cate the topic of the questioning and be sent sufficiently early to
permit preparation and consultation with counsel; (ii) the right
against self-incrimination should be enshrined specifically in any
provision for the questioning and taking of evidence from com-
pany officials; (iii) both counsel of the undertaking and counsel
for the person being examined should be allowed to attend and
advise the witness; and (iv) advice given by in-house counsel
should be excluded from the scope of any such questioning.
In addition, minutes should be taken and a designated com-
pany official, present at the taking of minutes, should be re-
quired to,.certify that the recorded minutes are indeed a true
82. See, e.g., Stauder v. Ulm, Case 29/69, [1969] E.C.R. 419, [1970] 9 C.M.L.R. 112;
Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3727, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 42.
83. The Court's decision in Orkem may have been superseded by subsequent devel-
opments. In denying the right of non self-incrimination in relation to infringements of
competition law, the Court argued that a comparative analysis of national law did not
indicate the existence of this principle in relation to infringements in the economic
sphere, in particular to competition law. As demonstrated above, however, national
laws are evolving. In fact, the Act contains an express provision to guarantee this right.
The Court moreover argued that neither the wording nor the decisions of Article 6 of
the Convention indicate that it upholds the right not to give evidence against oneself.
See also Funke v. France, [1993] 1 C.M.L.R. 897 (holding that Mr. Mr. Funke could not
be required by customs officials to produce bank statements that could incriminate
him); Saunders v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313 (1997). These decisions cast
severe doubts over the continuing validity of this statement. Both pillars of the Court's
assessment in Orkem have, therefore, become tenuous at the very least.
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and accurate reflection of what was said.84
2. Centralization of Authorization for Dawn Raids Would
Require a Treaty Amendment
In an attempt to strengthen the Commission's investigative
powers under Article 14(3) of Regulation 17, and, in particular,
to make simultaneous dawn raids in several Member States more
efficient, the Commission proposes to do away with the require-
ment, under the law of most Member States, that opposition by
the undertaking concerned can only be overcome by authoriza-
tion from a national judge. In the Commission's words, "the ele-
ment of judicial review could be centralized and entrusted to
one of the Community courts. "85
The Commission's proposal raises serious concerns from a
constitutional law perspective in that it relates to areas in which
the Member States have not yet transferred their sovereignty to
the EC. De lege lata, there is no legal basis under the EC law for
the authorization of a Community court to issue warrants in the
context of investigations under Article 14 of Regulation 17. The
issuance of such warrants touches on a number of fundamental
rights, including the right of the sanctity of premises and the
right not to incriminate oneself. These fundamental rights are
protected in virtually all Member States by constitutional law and
enjoy specific procedural protection, of which the need to ob-
tain warrants issued by national courts is just one example.
Contrary to what seems to be suggested in the White Paper,
the Member States have not transferred their sovereignty in this
regard to the Community, and it would require an amendment
of the Treaty for them to do so. The intended reform would
give the Commission the power to execute EC law, which is con-
trary to the existing principle that the enforcement of EC law lies
within the competence of the Member States. Under the princi-
ple of limited transfer of powers and subsidiarity, the Commu-
nity cannot act as legislator in order to gain genuine executive
powers. The Community has never had the competence to en-
force its own decisions. A comparison highlights the point: the
Commission can impose a fine on an undertaking but the Euro-
84. Proper court reporters should be available to avoid the current long delays in
access to minutes of hearings.
85. White Paper, supra note 1, O.J. C 132/1, at 27, 1 111 (1999).
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pean Court of Justice cannot enforce the fine by ordering the
freezing of the accounts of that undertaking if it refuses to pay.
The motivation to ensure the effective enforcement of EC com-
petition law in each Member State cannot be regarded as suffi-
cient to justify a transfer of powers outside the foreseen provi-
sions of a Treaty amendment.
In particular, Article 83 in its current form does not provide
a legal basis for implementing the Commission's proposal. Arti-
cle 83 empowers the Community to adopt procedural rules en-
suring the proper and efficient implementation of Articles 81
and 82. Legislative acts, adopted under this provision, do not,
however, supersede the procedural rules that exist in the Mem-
ber States, but can only complement such national rules in a way
that does not interfere with the Member States' sovereignty.
This is confirmed by the Court's judgment in Hoechst, where the
Court explains the function of the Member States' procedural
rules in the Community system of antitrust investigation as fol-
lows:
[I]t is for each Member State to determine the conditions
under which the national authorities will afford assistance to
the Commission' s officials .... It follows that.., the appro-
priate procedural rules designed to ensure respect for under-
takings' rights are those laid down by national law. Conse-
quently, if the Commission intends, with the assistance of the
national authorities, to carry out an investigation other than
with the cooperation of the undertakings concerned, it is re-
quired to respect the relevant procedural guarantees laid
down by national law. 86
35 [I] t is within the powers of the national body, after satisfy-
ing itself that the decision ordering the investigation is au-
thentic, to consider whether the measures of constraint envis-
aged are arbitrary or excessive having regard to the subject-
matter of the investigation and to ensure that the rules of na-
tional law are complied with in the application of those meas-
ures.
8 7
In the same case, Advocate General Mischo put his finger
on the basic problem that the Commission's proposal would
face. While he clearly prefers a centralized procedure like the
one proposed in the White Paper, he acknowledges that "the
86. Id. at 2928.
87. Id.
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only solution which would not be open to criticism would obvi-
ously be to supplement the EEC Treaty itself."
In sum, it is clear that implementation of the Commission's
proposal would require an amendment of the Treaty to the ef-
fect that the Member States transfer to the EC their sovereignty
with respect to antitrust investigations under Articles 81 and 82.
In light of the fundamental rights issues involved, however, the
Member States' willingness to agree to such an amendment is
difficult to imagine. 88
B. Recognition of In-house Counsel Legal Privilege
The Commission takes the position that EC law currently
recognizes privilege only for lawyers admitted to a European bar
and who are not employed by their clients.89 Under both the
White Paper and the proposal outlined above, the role of legal
advisors would greatly gain in importance as companies would
not be able to notify any agreements (or would notify fewer
agreements than before) and thus rely more heavily on the ad-
vice of legal counsel. At the same time, if no privilege were rec-
ognized for in-house counsel, under the White Paper the Com-
mission would be able to depose in-house counsel, or even to ask
spontaneous questions on the subject of the advice given." This
88. In addition, a Treaty amendment of this type would have to provide for suffi-
cient safeguards protecting the fundamental rights of the individuals involved in the
investigation.
89. AM&S Europe Limited v. Commission, Case 155/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1575, 1646-
47, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 264, 300-01; see also R Carlsen v. Council of the European Union,
Case T-610/97, [1998] E.C.R. 11-489 (holding that communications of Commission's
Legal Service were entitled to be kept from public scrutiny because confidentiality was
necessary for "the protection of the public interest in the stability of Community law and the
proper functioning of the institutions") (emphasis added). According to the President of
the Court of First Instance, opinions of the Legal Service are documents primarily in-
tended to provide the institution called upon to adopt a measure with an opinion on
legal issues. Id. He also noted that "[i]f documents of that nature were divulged, the
discussions and exchange of views within the institutions as to the legality and scope of
the legal measure to be adopted would be made public. As a result, the Council might
lose all interest in requesting the legal services for written opinions." Id. Although the
President sought to distinguish the arguments for Legal Service privilege from those in
favor of recognizing in-house counsel privilege, it is submitted that the reasoning con-
tained in the judgment is not convincing: company officials lose precisely the same
interest in requesting advice from their in-house lawyers as the Community institutions
would have lost in requesting advice from the Legal Service but for the Court's recogni-
tion of privilege for Legal Service opinions. Id.
90. White Paper, supra note 1, O.J. C 132/1, at 27, 113, 114 (1999).
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cannot be in the interest of encouraging companies' compliance
with EC competition law. Therefore, any future review of Regu-
lation 17 must include the recognition of legal privilege for in-
house counsel. In the course of the last round of revisions, the
European Parliament had already proposed the following
amendment:
Communications between a client and outside or in-house
counsel containing or seeking legal advice shall be privileged,
provided that the legal counsel is properly qualified and com-
plies with adequate rules of professional ethics and discipline
which are laid down and enforced in the general interest by
the professional associations to which the legal counsel be-
longs.91
While the Council did not adopt this proposal,92 the argu-
ments for in-house counsel privilege being recognized by EC law
are compelling. As it currently stands, in-house counsel are cur-
rently no less "independent" than external counsel. In AM & S,
the Court explained the independent role of outside counsel as
follows:
the requirement as to the position and status as an independ-
ent lawyer, which must be fulfilled by the legal adviser from
whom the written communications which may be protected
emanate, is based on a conception of the lawyer's role as col-
laborating in the administration of justice by the courts and
as being required to provide, in full independence, and in
the overriding interests of that cause, such legal assistance as
the client needs. The counterpart of that protection lies in
the rules of professional ethics and discipline which are laid
down and enforced in the general interest by institutions en-
dowed with the requisite powers for that purpose.
This suggests that in-house counsel, as employees, are eco-
nomically dependent on their company clients, must follow their
client's instructions, must subject themselves to supervision, and
owe their employer a duty of loyalty that overrides the duty to co-
91. Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) Amending Regulation No 17: First
Regulation Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, COM (98) 546 Final 98/
0288 (CNS) (Sept. 1998); see also Maurits Dolmans, Sauce for the Goose is Sauce for the
Gander, 4 EUROPEAN COUNSEL 1, 7, 8.
92. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1216/1999 of 10 June 1999 amending Regula-
tion No 17: First Regulation Implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, O.J. L 148/
5 (1999).
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operate in the administration ofjustice. In advising on competi-
tion compliance, however, in-house counsel's position is analo-
gous to that of external counsel, in particular where the former
is admitted to a European bar or otherwise governed by rules of
professional conduct and ethics. The duty of loyalty that an em-
ployee owes to its employer cannot encompass the right know-
ingly to participate in illegal activities, to withhold information
from the courts or authorities such as the Commission when dis-
closure is required, or to frustrate the administration of justice.
Firms set up legal departments for the very purpose of advising
management and to ensure full compliance with the law. The
key to "full independence" does not lie, therefore, in the status
of employed or self-employed lawyer, but in the rights and obli-
gations, as a professional, to act ethically as defined by the rules
of professional ethics and discipline.
Recognition of in-house privilege would promote more ef-
fective competition compliance. Like outside counsel privilege,
in-house counsel privilege contributes to the maintenance of the
rule of law, including EC competition law. Compliance with the
rule of law requires effective communications between manage-
ment and in-house or outside counsel. The failure to recognize
in-house counsel privilege and the risk that in-house counsel
may be deposed, hampers the ability of in-house counsel to give
effective and proper advice. This limits the conduct of the busi-
ness.
First, counsel can give proper advice only if he or she is
aware of all relevant facts. Unfortunately, in practice, manage-
ment cannot be expected to inform counsel of all relevant facts
in potentially sensitive matters if it suspects that counsel will then
have to turn over the full contents of its legal advice to an investi-
gatory authority. Second, a law department can give advice only
if it can prepare and retain internal notes reflecting legal re-
search-which may well reflect an initial analysis and conclusion
that is different from the final advice-and cannot be expected
to prepare its advice with sufficient care if such notes or prelimi-
nary conclusions would have to be disclosed or discussed during
oral examination of counsel. Third, clear advice is normally pos-
sible only if counsel can write it down, and not just convey it
orally. Without in-house counsel privilege, legal advice may be
incorrect, misunderstood, or not recorded for future reference.
This creates the risk of incorrectness and incompleteness. All
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these problems would, of course, be exacerbated if the Commis-
sion could depose in-house counsel regarding the advice given.
In sum, in-house counsel's role in ensuring respect of the
law is as great as that of external counsel. Because of their prox-
imity to the company's day-to-day administration, in-house coun-
sel are also better suited to ensure compliance. In these circum-
stances, their need for privilege may exceed that of outside
counsel.
As a number of Member States recognize in-house counsel
privilege, certain of the White Paper's proposals risk inconsistent
enforcement of the competition rules. The White Paper con-
tains proposals enabling NCAs to refer certain investigations to
the Commission. Specifically, it provides that: (i) an NCA con-
sidering a case, whether at EC or national level, must be in a
position to pass on a file to another NCA (including any confi-
dential information) that might be used in procedures for in-
fringement of the EC competition rules93 and (ii) where the ef-
fects of a practice are felt primarily in one Member State, the
Commission may send a case-file, including any confidential in-
formation, to the competent NCA for it to continue the investi-
gation with the evidence supplied.
The only limitation in this regard is that the information
could only be used for the purpose for which it was originally
collected, regardless of which NCA made the earlier inquiries
(i.e., for the application of Articles 81 and 82 or of national com-
petition law)." As certain Member States recognize in-house
counsel privilege, these proposals are likely to present several
difficulties and result in the inconsistent application and en-
forcement of the competition rules and rules concerning the
rights of defense.
93. White Paper, supra note 1, OJ. C 132/1, at 23, 92 (1999).
94. Id., O.J. C 132/1 at 24, 97 (1999).
